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SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, STATE FOR AF/C, AF/SPG,
AF/RSA, AND IO OFFICES

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TAGS: PREL KPKO PREF PHUM UN EU SUDAN LY CT CD

SUBJECT: SRSG SEEKS CHANGES TO MINURCAT MANDATE TO PREPARE -- FOR EXPANDED UN PKO TO REPLACE EUFOR IN CHAD, CAR.

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¶11. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE: SEE PARA 10.

¶12. (SBU) SUMMARY: SRSG Victor Angelo briefed UNSC member Chiefs of Mission July 3 on the upcoming report of the UNSYG on the UN Mission to Chad and CAR. He requested that UNSC member Chiefs of Mission alert capitals and PermReps of the changes he is requesting to MINURCAT's mandate. He would like (a) to see the number of Chadian gendarmes trained doubled to 1700; (b) that the SRSG play a more active role in the Dakar Accord implementation process, and (c) to replace EUFOR with an expanded UN PKO composed of three elements, a military element of 2,000, a "Formed Police Unit" element of 1,200, and a Chadian gendarme element of 1,700; and that the MINURCAT role in CAR not be ignored or reduced. He also objected to what he called inaccurate mention of the JEM in the text of the report.

¶13. (SBU) We think all four of the SRSG's recommendations deserve USG consideration and support. SRSG understanding of Chadian realities has enabled him to provide exemplary leadership to MINURCAT and to collaborate usefully and productively with both the GOC and EUFOR on the ground in Chad. He has been particularly effective at building confidence within the Government of Chad regarding the international community's peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts in Chad. END SUMMARY.

¶14. (SBU) SRSG Victor Angelo briefed UNSC member Chiefs of Mission July 3 on the upcoming "report of the Secretary General on the United Nation's Mission in Chad and the Northeastern Central African Republic." Present were COMs of the United States, France, China, Libya, and South Africa. He said that he was seeking changes in MINURCAT's mandate, which will be coming up for renewal soon, to enable MINURCAT to become an expanded UN PKO capable of replacing EUFOR when its mandate ends in early 2009. He described the Mission's progress as generally satisfactory, especially regarding its relationships with the Chadian government and with EUFOR.

¶15. (SBU) SRSG identified four areas in which he would like to see changes to the MINURCAT mandate. First, he would like to double the number of Chadian gendarmes and police trained and mentored to 1,700. Second, he would like to be authorized to play a more active role in the implementation process of the Dakar Accord. Third, he would like to see EUFOR replaced (when its mandate ends in March 2009) by a UN peacekeeping mission that would have three elements: a military element numbering about 2,000; a "Formed Police Unit" element numbering about 1,200, and a Chadian gendarme element of 1,700. Fourth, he was concerned that MINURCAT's role in the CAR not be reduced or altered. SRSG also mentioned that he wanted to remove what he considered erroneous mention of the JEM involvement in the June Chadian armed rebel attack on eastern Chad.

¶16. (SBU) SRSG explained that the "Formed Police Unit" was an

essential element in an expanded UN PKO to succeed EUFOR in eastern Chad. The current EU-UN joint PKO effort lacked this element, which would provide an expanded UN PKO with a "flexible response" capability, permitting it to better calibrate its response to threats of different degrees of menace. He cited the recent incident at Goz Beida in which EUFOR troops acted to protect humanitarian workers from armed rebel depredations as an example of a situation in which a heavily armed gendarme presence might have obviated a military response.

¶7. (SBU) During the course of the briefing, the French Ambassador mentioned that he understood that the CEMAC had decided to ask the UN to authorize MINURCAT to include military observers along the Chadian-Sudanese border in MINURCAT's renewed mandate. Neither the French Ambassador nor the SRSG had any further information on any possible CEMAC action in this regard. SRSG has long maintained that he believes that MINURCAT could implement a military observation operation along the troubled Chad-Sudan border, if provided with adequate additional resources (See REFTEL).

¶8. (SBU) COMMENT: We think all four of the SRSG's recommendations have merit and deserve USG consideration and support. We continue to believe that Angelo's understanding of Chadian realities has enabled him to provide exemplary leadership to MINURCAT and to collaborate usefully and productively with EUFOR on the ground in Chad. He has been particularly effective at building confidence within the Government of Chad regarding the international community's peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts in Chad.

¶9. (SBU) We are particularly concerned that there be a follow-on UN PKO to replace EUFOR after the latter's departure, which is foreseen to begin in early 2009 and we think that such a force should be structured along the lines SRSG proposes, composed of three different security elements, which reflects the realities on the ground in Chad. Finally, we share SRSG's concern that the report

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not address contentious political issues based on limited knowledge of political terrain here and we agree that what both Angelo and we regard as inaccurate mention of JEM in the report may undermine MINURCAT's credibility with the GOC and jeopardize GOC future support for an expanded UN PKO to replace EUFOR. END COMMENT.

¶10. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: That the Department and USUN consider supporting changes to MINURCAT's mandate along the lines of the four provisions SRSG discussed and support removal of mention of JEM from the report.

NIGRO